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James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara
he Asian seas today are witnessing an intriguing historical anomaly—the si-
multaneous rises of two homegrown maritime powers against the backdrop 
of U.S. dominion over the global commons. The drivers behind this apparent ir-
regularity in the Asian regional order are, of course, China and India. Their aspi-
rations for great-power status and, above all, their quests for energy security have 
compelled both Beijing and New Delhi to redirect their gazes from land to the 
seas. While Chinese and Indian maritime interests are a natural outgrowth of im-
pressive economic growth and the attendant appetite for energy resources, their 
simultaneous entries into the nautical realm also portend worrisome trends.
PROSPECTS FOR A STRATEGIC TRIANGLE 
At present, some strategists in both capitals speak and write in terms that an-
ticipate rivalry with each other. Given that commercial shipping must traverse 
the same oceanic routes to reach Indian and Chinese ports, mutual fears persist 
that the bodies of water stretching from the Persian Gulf to the South China Sea 
could be held hostage in the event of crisis or confl ict.1 Such insecurities simi-
larly animated naval competition in the past when major powers depended on 
a common nautical space. Moreover, lingering questions over the sustainability 
of American primacy on the high seas have heightened concerns about the U.S. 
Navy’s ability to guarantee maritime stability, a state of affairs that has long been 
taken for granted. 
It is within this more fl uid context that the Indian Ocean has assumed greater 
prominence. Unfortunately, much of the recent discourse has focused on future 
Chinese naval ambitions in the Indian Ocean and on potential U.S. responses 
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to such a new presence. In other words, the novelty, as it currently stands, of 
the Indian Ocean stems from expected encounters between extraregional pow-
ers. But such a narrow analytical approach assumes that the region will remain 
an inanimate object perpetually vulnerable to outside manipulation. Also, more 
importantly, it overlooks the possible interactions arising from the intervention 
of India, the dominant regional power. Indeed, omitting the potential role that 
India might play in any capacity would risk misreading the future of the Indian 
Ocean region.
There is, therefore, an urgent need to bring India more completely into the 
picture as a full participant, if not a major arbiter, in the region’s maritime future. 
In order to add depth to the existing literature, this article assesses the longer-
term maritime trajectory of the Indian Ocean region by examining the triangular 
dynamics among the United States, China, and India. To be sure, the aspirational 
nature of Chinese and Indian nautical ambitions and capabilities at the moment 
precludes attempts at discerning potential outcomes or supplying concrete policy 
prescriptions. Nevertheless, exploring the basic foundations for cooperation or 
competition among the three powers could provide hints at how Beijing, Wash-
ington, and New Delhi can actively preclude rivalry and promote collaboration 
in the Indian Ocean.
As a fi rst step in this endeavor, this article examines a key ingredient in the 
expected emergence of a “strategic triangle”—the prospects of Indian sea power. 
While no one has rigorously defi ned this international-relations metaphor, schol-
ars typically use it to convey a strategic interplay of interests among three nation-
states. In this initial foray, we employ the term fairly loosely, using it to describe 
a pattern of cooperation and competition among the United States, China, and 
India. It is our contention that Indian Ocean stability will hinge largely on how 
India manages its maritime rise. On the one hand, if a robust Indian maritime 
presence were to fail to materialize, New Delhi would essentially be forced to sur-
render its interests in regional waters, leaving a strategic vacuum to the United 
States and China. On the other hand, if powerful Indian naval forces were one day 
to be used for exclusionary purposes, the region would almost certainly become 
an arena for naval competition. Either undesirable outcome would be shaped in 
part by how India views its own maritime prerogatives and by how Washington 
and Beijing weigh the probabilities of India’s nautical success or failure in the 
Indian Ocean. 
If all three parties foresee a muscular Indian naval policy, then, a more martial 
environment in the Indian Ocean will likely take shape. But if the three powers 
view India and each other with equanimity, the prospects for cooperation will 
brighten considerably. Capturing the perspectives of the three powers on India’s 
maritime ambitions is thus a critical analytical starting point. 
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To provide a comprehensive overview of each capital’s estimate of future In-
dian maritime power, this article gauges the current literature and forecasts in 
India, the United States, and China on Indian maritime strategy, doctrine, and 
capabilities. It then concludes with an analysis of how certain changes in the mar-
itime geometry in the Indian Ocean might be conducive to either cooperation or 
competition. 
INDIA’S SELF-ASSESSMENT
While Indian maritime strategists are not ardent followers of Alfred Thayer 
Mahan, they do use him to underscore the importance of the Indian Ocean. A 
Mahan quotation (albeit of doubtful provenance) commonly appears in offi cial 
and academic discussions of Indian naval power, including the newly published 
Maritime Military Strategy.2 That is, as an offi cial Indian press release declared 
in 2002, “Mahan, the renowned naval strategist and scholar[,] had said over a 
century ago[,] ‘whosoever controls the Indian Ocean, dominates Asia. In the 21st 
century, the destiny of the world will be decided upon its waters.’”3 Rear Admiral 
R. Chopra, then the head of sea training for the Indian Navy, offered a somewhat 
less bellicose-sounding but equally evocative version of the quotation at a semi-
nar on maritime history: “Whoever controls the Indian Ocean controls Asia. This 
ocean is the key to the Seven Seas.”4 
Quibbles over history aside, India clearly sees certain diplomatic, economic, 
and military interests at stake in Indian Ocean waters. In particular, shipments of 
Middle East oil, natural gas, and raw materials are crucial to India’s effort to build 
up economic strength commensurate with the needs and geopolitical aspirations 
of the Indian people. Some 90 percent of world trade, measured by bulk, travels 
by sea. A sizable share of that total must traverse narrow seas in India’s geographic 
neighborhood, notably the straits at Hormuz, Malacca, and Bab el Mandeb. Ship-
ping is at its most vulnerable in such confi ned waterways.
Strategists in New Delhi couch their appraisals of India’s maritime surround-
ings in intensely geopolitical terms—jarringly so for Westerners accustomed to 
the notion that economic globalization has rendered power politics and armed 
confl ict passé. The Indian economy has grown at a rapid clip—albeit not as rap-
idly as China’s—allowing an increasingly confi dent Indian government to yoke 
hard power, measured in ships, aircraft, and weapons systems, to a foreign policy 
aimed at primacy in the Indian Ocean region.5 If intervention in regional dis-
putes or the internal affairs of South Asian states is necessary, imply Indian lead-
ers, India should do the intervening rather than allow outsiders any pretext for 
doing so.
Any doctrine aimed at regional preeminence will have a strong seafaring com-
ponent. In 2004, accordingly, New Delhi issued its fi rst public analysis of the 
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nation’s oceanic environs and of how to cope with challenges there. Straightfor-
wardly titled Indian Maritime Doctrine, the document describes India’s maritime 
strategy largely as a function of economic development and prosperity:
India’s primary maritime interest is to assure national security. This is not 
restricted to just guarding the coastline and island territories, but also extends 
to safeguarding our interests in the [exclusive economic zone] as well as protect-
ing our trade. This creates an environment that is conducive to rapid economic 
growth of the country. Since trade is the lifeblood of India, keeping our SLOCs 
[sea lines of communication] open in times of peace, tension or hostilities is a 
primary national maritime interest.6 
The trade conveyed by the sea-lanes traversing the Indian Ocean ranks fi rst 
among the “strategic realities” that the framers of the Indian Maritime Doctrine 
discern. Roughly forty merchantmen pass through India’s “waters of interest” 
every day. An estimated $200 billion worth of oil transits the Strait of Hormuz 
annually, while some $60 billion transits the Strait of Malacca en route to China, 
Japan, and other East Asian countries reliant on energy imports.7
India’s geographic location and conformation rank next in New Delhi’s hierar-
chy of strategic realities. Notes the Indian Maritime Doctrine, “India sits astride . . .
major commercial routes and energy lifelines” crisscrossing the Indian Ocean 
region. Outlying Indian possessions such as the Andaman and Nicobar islands 
sit athwart the approaches to the Strait of Malacca, while the Persian Gulf is near 
India’s western coastline, conferring a measure of infl uence over vital sea com-
munications to and from what amounts to a bay in the Indian Ocean. While 
geography may not be destiny, the document states bluntly that “by virtue of our 
geography, we are . . . in a position to greatly infl uence the movement/security 
of shipping along the SLOCs in the [Indian Ocean Region] provided we have 
the maritime power to do so. Control of the choke points could be useful as a 
bargaining chip in the international power game, where the currency of military 
power remains a stark reality.”8 
The Indian Maritime Doctrine prophesies a depletion of world energy resources 
that will make the prospect of outside military involvement in India’s geographic 
environs even more acute than it already is. The dependence of modern econo-
mies on the Gulf region and Central Asia “has already invited the presence of 
extra-regional powers and the accompanying Command, Control, Surveillance 
and Intelligence network. The security implications for us are all too obvious.” 
Sizable deposits of other resources—uranium, tin, gold, diamonds—around the 
Indian Ocean littoral only accentuate the factors beckoning the attention of out-
side maritime powers to the region.9
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Indian leaders, then, take a somber view of the international security environ-
ment. In the “polycentric world order” New Delhi sees taking shape, economics is 
“the major determinant of a nation’s power.” While “India holds great promise,” 
owing to its size, location, and economic acumen, its “emergence as an economic 
power will undoubtedly be resisted by the existing economic powers, leading to 
confl icts based on economic factors.” The likelihood that competitors will “deny 
access to technology and other industrial inputs,” combined with “the shift in 
global maritime focus from the Atlantic-Pacifi c combine to the Pacifi c–Indian 
Ocean region,” will only heighten the attention major powers pay to the seas.10
A buildup of Indian maritime power represents the only prudent response 
to strategic conditions that are at once promising and worrisome in economic 
terms. Maritime threats fall into two broad categories, in the Indians’ reckoning. 
First, judging from offi cial pronouncements such as the maritime doctrine and 
the newly published Maritime Military Strategy, New Delhi is acutely conscious 
that such nontraditional threats as seagoing terrorism, weapons proliferation, 
or piracy could disrupt vital sea-lanes. Cleansing Asian waters of these universal 
scourges has become a matter of real and growing concern.11
Second, Indians are wary not only of banditry and unlawful traffi cking but 
also of rival navies. While Indian strategists exude growing confi dence, increas-
ingly looking beyond perennial nemesis Pakistan, they remain mindful of the 
Pakistani naval challenge, a permanent feature of Indian Ocean strategic affairs. 
Over the longer term, a Chinese naval buildup in the Indian Ocean, perhaps cen-
tered on Beijing’s much-discussed “string of pearls,” would represent cause for 
concern.12 This is the most likely quarter from which a threat to Indian maritime 
security could emanate over the long term, once China resolves the Taiwan ques-
tion to its satisfaction and is free to redirect its attention to important interests in 
other regions—such as free passage for commercial shipping through the Indian 
Ocean region.
But Indians remain acutely conscious that the U.S. Navy rules the waves in 
Asia, as it has since World War II. Despite closer maritime ties with the United 
States, Indian offi cials bridle at memories of the Seventh Fleet’s intervention in 
the Bay of Bengal during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war. They also remain ambiva-
lent about the American military presence on Diego Garcia, which they see as an 
American beachhead in the Indian Ocean region. Observes one Indian scholar, 
Diego Garcia and the Bengal naval deployment have “seeped into Indians’ cul-
tural memory—even among those who know nothing about the sea.”13 Whatever 
the prospects for a U.S.-Indian strategic partnership, such memories will give rise 
to a measure of wariness in bilateral ties. On balance, the factors impinging on 
Indian and U.S. strategic calculations will make for some form of partnership—
but perhaps not the grand alliance American leaders seem to assume. Even 
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partnership is not a sure thing, however, and sustaining it will require painstaking 
work on both sides.
HISTORICAL MODELS FOR INDIAN SEA POWER
The challenges it perceives as it surveys India’s surroundings and the novelty of 
Indian pursuit of sea power have induced New Delhi to consult Western history. 
That Indians would look to American rather than European history for guid-
ance, however, may come as a surprise. Given their skepticism toward American 
maritime supremacy—the residue of Cold War ideological competition, as well 
as a product of geopolitical calculations—nineteenth-century American history 
represents an unlikely source for lessons to inform the efforts of Indians to amass 
maritime power.
There is a theoretical dimension to India’s maritime turn as well. Many schol-
ars of “realist” leanings assume that the sort of balance-of-power politics prac-
ticed in nineteenth-century Europe will prevail in Asia as the rises of China and 
India reorder regional politics.14 If so, the coming years will see Asian statesmen 
jockeying for geopolitical advantage in the manner of a Bismarck or Talleyrand. 
There is merit to objections to the notion that strategic triangles and similar met-
aphors are artifacts of nineteenth-century thinking, and many Indians and Chi-
nese think in geopolitical terms reminiscent of that age. Other scholars deny that 
European-style realpolitik is universal, predicting instead a revival of Asia’s hier-
archical, China-centric past.15 Chinese diplomats have skillfully encouraged such 
notions, hinting that a maritime order presided over by a capable, benevolent 
China—and excluding predatory Western sea powers such as America—would 
benefi t all Asian peoples, now as in bygone centuries.16
Indians more commonly look for insight to a third model—the Monroe Doc-
trine, the nineteenth-century American policy declaration that purported to 
place the New World off limits to new European territorial acquisitions or to any 
extension of the European political system to American states not already under 
Europe’s control. James Monroe and John Quincy Adams (the architects of the 
Monroe Doctrine), Grover Cleveland and Richard Olney (who viewed the doc-
trine as a virtual warrant for U.S. rule of the Americas), and Theodore Roosevelt 
(who gave the doctrine a forceful twist of his own) may exercise as much infl u-
ence in Asia—particularly South Asia—as any fi gure from European or Asian 
history.
Soon after independence, Indian statesmen and pundits took to citing the 
Monroe Doctrine as a model for Indian foreign policy. It is not entirely clear why 
Indians adopted a Western paradigm for their pursuit of regional preeminence 
rather than some indigenous model suited to South Asian conditions. India’s tra-
dition of nonalignment surely played some role in this, however. For one thing, 
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Monroe and Adams announced their doctrine in an era when American nations 
were throwing off colonial rule, while India’s security doctrine had its origins in 
the post–World War II era of decolonization. Thus the United States of Mon-
roe’s day, like newly independent India, positioned itself as the leader of a bloc of 
nations within a geographically circumscribed region, resisting undue political 
infl uence—or worse—from external great powers. This imparts some resonance 
to Monroe’s principles despite the passage of time and the obvious dissimilarities 
between American and Indian histories and traditions. 
Thus the diplomatic context was apt—especially since Indian statesmen intent 
on effective “strategic communications” designed their policy pronouncements 
to appeal to not only domestic but also Western audiences. Prime Minister Jawa-
harlal Nehru’s speech justifying the use of force to evict Portugal from the coastal 
enclave of Goa is worth quoting at length:
Even some time after the United States had established itself as a strong power, 
there was the fear of interference by European powers in the American continents, 
and this led to the famous declaration by President Monroe of the United States 
[that] any interference by a European country would be an interference with the 
American political system. I submit that . . . the Portuguese retention of Goa is a 
continuing interference with the political system established in India today. I shall 
go a step further and say that any interference by any other power would also be 
an interference with the political system of India today. . . . It may be that we are 
weak and we cannot prevent that interference. But the fact is that any attempt by a 
foreign power to interfere in any way with India is a thing which India cannot toler-
ate, and which, subject to her strength, she will oppose. That is the broad doctrine I 
lay down.17
Parsing Nehru’s bracing words, the following themes emerge. First, while a Eu-
ropean power’s presence in South Asia precipitated his foreign-policy doctrine, 
he forbade any outside power to take any action in the region that New Delhi 
might construe as imperiling the Indian political system. This was a sweeping 
injunction indeed. Second, he acknowledged the realities of power but seeming-
ly contemplated enforcing his doctrine with new vigor as Indian power waxed, 
making new means and options available. Third, Nehru asked no one’s permis-
sion to pursue such a doctrine. While this doctrine would not qualify as interna-
tional law, then, it was a policy statement to which New Delhi would give effect as 
national means permitted. India did expel Portugal from Goa in 1961—affi xing 
an exclamation point to Nehru’s words.
Prime Ministers Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi were especially assertive 
about enforcing India’s security doctrine.18 From 1983 to 1990, for example, New 
Delhi applied political and military pressure in an effort to bring about an end 
to the Sri Lankan civil war. It deployed Indian troops to the embattled island, 
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waging a bitter counterinsurgent campaign—in large part because Indian lead-
ers feared that the United States would involve itself in the dispute, in the pro-
cess obtaining a new geostrategic foothold at Trincomalee, along India’s southern 
fl ank. One commentator in India Today interpreted New Delhi’s politico-military 
efforts as “a repetition of the Monroe Doctrine, a forcible statement that any ex-
ternal forces prejudicial to India’s interests cannot be allowed to swim in regional 
waters.”19
India’s security doctrine also manifested itself in 1988, when Indian forces in-
tervened in a coup in the Maldives, and in an 1989–90 trade dispute with Nepal. 
A Western scholar, Devin Hagerty, sums up Indian security doctrine thus:
The essence of this formulation is that India strongly opposes outside intervention 
in the domestic affairs of other South Asian nations, especially by outside powers 
whose goals are perceived to be inimical to Indian interests. Therefore, no South 
Asian government should ask for outside assistance from any country; rather, if 
a South Asian nation genuinely needs external assistance, it should seek it from 
India. A failure to do so will be considered anti-Indian.20 
This fl urry of activity subsided after the Cold War, as the strategic environ-
ment appeared to improve and New Delhi embarked on an ambitious program 
of economic liberalization and reform. Even so, infl uential pundits—even those 
who dispute the notion of a consistent Indian security doctrine—continue to 
speak in these terms.
Indeed, they seemingly take the concept of an Indian Monroe Doctrine for 
granted. C. Raja Mohan, to name one leading pundit, routinely uses this ter-
minology, matter-of-factly titling one op-ed column “Beyond India’s Monroe 
Doctrine” and in another exclaiming that “China just tore up India’s Monroe 
Doctrine.”21 Speaking at the U.S. Naval War College in November 2007, Rear 
Admiral Chopra vouchsafed that India should “emulate America’s nineteenth-
century rise” to sea power. As India’s naval capabilities mature, matching ambi-
tious ends with vibrant means, its need to cooperate with outside sea powers will 
diminish. Declared Chopra, New Delhi might then see fi t to enforce “its own 
Monroe Doctrine” in the region.22 The doctrine has entered into India’s vocabu-
lary of foreign relations and maritime strategy. Again, using nineteenth-century 
American history as a proxy, we can discern three possible maritime futures for 
India:
“Monroe.” Indian statesmen animated by Monroe’s principles as originally un-
derstood would take advantage of the maritime security furnished by a domi-
nant navy (Great Britain’s Royal Navy then, the U.S. Navy now), dedicating most 
of their nation’s resources and energies to internal development. Limited ef-
forts at suppressing piracy, terrorism, and weapons traffi cking—the latter-day 
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equivalents to the slave trade, a scourge the U.S. and Royal navies worked togeth-
er to suppress—would be admissible under these principles, as would disaster 
relief and other humanitarian operations intended to amass goodwill and lay the 
groundwork for more assertive diplomatic ventures in the future. This modest 
reading of the Monroe Doctrine would not forbid informal cooperation with the 
U.S. Navy, today’s equivalent to the Royal Navy of Monroe’s day.
“Cleveland/Olney.” In 1895, President Grover Cleveland’s secretary of state, 
Richard Olney, informed Great Britain that the American “fi at is law” throughout 
the Western Hemisphere, by virtue of not only American enlightenment but also 
physical might—the republic’s capacity to make good on Monroe’s precepts.23 
This hypermuscular vision of the Monroe Doctrine would impel aspirants to 
sea power to avow openly their desire to dominate surrounding waters and lit-
toral regions. From a geographic standpoint, the Cleveland/Olney model would 
urge them to make good on their claims to regional supremacy, employing naval 
forces to project power throughout vast areas. No international dispute would be 
off limits that national leaders deemed a threat to their interests, and they would 
evince a standoffi sh attitude toward proposals for cooperation with external na-
val powers.
“Roosevelt.” Theodore Roosevelt took a preventive view of the Monroe Doctrine, 
framing “an international police power” that justifi ed American intervention in 
the affairs of weak American states when it appeared that Europeans might use 
naval force to collect debts owed their lenders—and, in the process, wrest naval 
stations from states along sea-lanes vital to U.S. shipping. TR’s interpretation of 
the Monroe Doctrine, as expressed in his 1904 “corollary” to it, called for a de-
fensive posture: Monroe’s principles applied when vital national interests were 
at stake, and the would-be dominant power could advance its good-government 
ideals. These principles would apply, however, within circumscribed regions of 
vital interest and be implemented with circumspection, using minimal force, 
and that in concert with other tools of national power. Cooperation with outside 
powers with no likely desire or capacity to infringe on the hegemon’s interests 
would be acceptable.24
What form such a doctrine will assume, and how vigorously New Delhi pros-
ecutes it, will depend on such factors as Indian history and traditions, the natures 
and magnitudes of the security challenges Indians perceive in the Indian Ocean, 
the vagaries of domestic politics, and the Indian Navy’s ability to make more than 
fi tful progress toward fi elding potent naval weapon systems.25 India will pursue 
its doctrine according to its needs and capabilities—just as each generation of 
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Americans reinterpreted the Monroe Doctrine to suit its own needs and material 
power.
AMERICAN VIEWS OF INDIAN SEA POWER
Curiously, given the importance they attach to the burgeoning U.S.-Indian re-
lationship and their concerted efforts to forge a seagoing partnership, American 
policy makers and maritime strategists have paid scant attention to the evolu-
tion of Indian sea power or the motives and aspirations prompting New Delhi’s 
seaward turn. One small example: the Pentagon publishes no Indian counterpart 
to its annual report The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, despite 
the growth of Indian power and ambition. To the contrary: American diplomats 
speak in glowing terms of a “natural strategic partnership” between “the world’s 
biggest” and “the world’s oldest” democracies, while the U.S. military has reached 
out to the Indian military on the tactical and operational levels—through, for 
example, the sixteen-year-old MALABAR series of combined maritime exercises.26 
Few in Washington have devoted much energy to what lies between high diplo-
macy and hands-on military-to-military cooperation, to analyzing the maritime 
component of Indian grand strategy.
True, the recently published U.S. Maritime Strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 
21st Century Seapower, proclaims that “credible combat power will be continu-
ously postured in the Western Pacifi c and the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean,” but its 
rationale for doing so is purely functional in nature: guarding American interests, 
assuring allies, deterring competitors, and so forth.27 The multinational context 
for this pronouncement—how Washington ought to manage relations with re-
gional maritime powers, such as India, on which the success of a cooperative 
maritime strategy ineluctably depends—is left unexplained. Why New Delhi has 
rebuffed such seemingly uncontroversial U.S.-led ventures as the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI), a primarily maritime effort to combat the traffi c in ma-
teriel related to weapons of mass destruction, and Task Force 150, the multina-
tional naval squadron monitoring for terrorists fl eeing Afghanistan, will remain 
a mystery to American offi cials absent this larger context.28
Why the apparent complacency toward India on the part of U.S. offi cials? 
Several possible explanations come to mind. For one thing, the United States 
does not see India as a threat. The Clinton and Bush administrations have en-
listed New Delhi in a “Concert of Democracies,” and, as mentioned before, they 
view India as a natural strategic partner or ally. For another, other matters have 
dominated the bilateral relationship in recent years. The Bush administration 
lifted the sanctions imposed after the 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests and 
negotiated an agreement providing for transfers of American nuclear technol-
ogy to the Indian commercial nuclear sector in exchange for partial international 
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supervision of Indian nuclear facilities. Legislative approval of this “123” agree-
ment remains uncertain, in large part because of questions as to whether new In-
dian nuclear tests would terminate the accord.29 Maritime cooperation has been 
subsumed in other issues. Also, and more to the point, India has been slow to 
publish a maritime strategy that American analysts can study. Its Maritime Doc-
trine appeared in 2004, but a full-fl edged maritime military strategy appeared 
only in 2007—meaning that India watchers in the United States have had little 
time to parse its meaning and its implications for U.S.-Indian collaboration at 
sea, let alone to publish and debate their fi ndings.
For now, absent signifi cant policy attention, any maritime-strategic partner-
ship will take place on the functional level, with “naval diplomacy” fi lling the void 
left by policy makers. How Washington will grapple with Indian skepticism to-
ward the PSI and other enterprises remains to be seen. If New Delhi does indeed 
embark on a Monroe Doctrine—especially one of the more militant variants 
identifi ed above—political supervision of U.S. naval diplomacy will be at a pre-
mium for Washington. Should the nuclear deal falter in Congress, for example, 
will that further affront the sensibilities of Indians intent on regional primacy? If 
so, with what impact on American mariners’ efforts to negotiate a good working 
relationship at sea? The opportunity to craft a close strategic partnership with 
New Delhi could be a short-lived one as Indian power grows, especially if Indian 
leaders take an ominous view of their nation’s geopolitical surroundings or if 
irritants to U.S.-Indian relations begin to accumulate.
CHINESE VIEWS OF INDIAN SEA POWER
If American analysts seem blasé about the intentions and capabilities of their 
prospective strategic partner, many Chinese analysts depict the basic motives be-
hind India’s maritime ambitions in starkly geopolitical terms. Indeed, their as-
sumptions and arguments are unmistakably Mahanian. Zhang Ming of Modern 
Ships asserts, “The Indian subcontinent is akin to a massive triangle reaching into 
the heart of the Indian Ocean, benefi ting any from there who seeks to control 
the Indian Ocean.”30 In an article casting suspicion on Indian naval intentions, 
the author states, “Geostrategically speaking, the Indian Ocean is a link of com-
munication and oil transportation between the Pacifi c and Atlantic Oceans and 
India is just like a giant and never-sinking aircraft carrier and the most impor-
tant strategic point guarding the Indian Ocean.”31 The reference to an unsinkable
aircraft carrier was clearly meant to trigger an emotional reaction, given that for 
many Chinese the phrase is most closely associated with Taiwan.
Intriguingly, some have invoked Mahanian language, wrongly attributed to 
Mahan himself, to describe the value of the Indian Ocean to New Delhi. One 
Chinese commentator quotes (without citation) Mahan as asserting, “Whoever 
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controls the Indian Ocean will dominate India and the coastal states of the Indian 
Ocean as well as control the massive area between the Mediterranean and the 
Pacifi c Ocean.”32 In a more expansive reformulation, two articles cite Mahan as 
declaring, “Whoever controls the Indian Ocean controls Asia. The Indian Ocean 
is the gateway to the world’s seven seas. The destiny of the world in the 21st cen-
tury will be determined by the Indian Ocean.”33 (As noted before, a very similar, 
and likewise apocryphal, Mahan quotation has made the rounds in India—even 
fi nding its way into the offi cial Maritime Military Strategy.) Faulty attribution 
notwithstanding, the Chinese are clearly drawn to Mahanian notions of sea pow-
er when forecasting how India will approach its maritime environs.
Zhao Bole, a professor of South Asian studies at Sichuan University, places 
these claims in a more concrete geopolitical context. Argues Zhao, four key geo-
strategic factors have underwritten India’s rise. First, India and its surrounding 
areas boast a wealth of natural resources. Second, India is by far the most power-
ful country in the Indian Ocean region. Third, the physical distance separating 
the United States from India affords New Delhi ample geopolitical space for ma-
neuver. Fourth, India borders economically dynamic regions such as the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states and China. Zhao quotes Nehru 
and K. M. Panikkar to prove that Indian politicians and strategists have long rec-
ognized these geopolitical advantages and that they have consistently evinced the 
belief that India’s destiny is inextricably tied to the Indian Ocean.34 However, due 
to India’s insistence on taking a third way during the Cold War superpower com-
petition, New Delhi was content to focus on its own subcontinental affairs.
In the 1990s, though, Zhao argues, India sought to shake off its nonaligned 
posture by increasing its geopolitical activism in Southeast Asia under the guise 
of its “Look East” policy. According to Zhao Gancheng, New Delhi leveraged 
its unique geographic position to make Southeast Asia—an intensely maritime 
theater—a “breakthrough point” (突破口), particularly in the economic realm. 
In the twenty-fi rst century, Zhao argues, the Look East policy has assumed sig-
nifi cant strategic dimensions, suggesting that India has entered a new phase 
intimately tied to its great-power ambitions. While acknowledging that the un-
derlying strategic logic pushing India beyond the subcontinent is compelling, 
Zhao worries that Indian prominence among the ASEAN states could tempt the 
United States to view India as a potential counterweight to China.35
To Chinese observers, these broader geopolitical forces seem to conform to the 
more outward-looking Indian maritime strategy on exhibit in recent years, and 
they tend to confi rm Chinese suspicions of an expansive and ambitious pattern 
to India’s naval outlook. Zhang Xiaolin and Qu Yutao divide the evolution of 
Indian maritime strategy, particularly with regard to its geographic scope, into 
three distinct phases: 
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Offshore defense (• 近海防御) (from independence to the late 1960s)
Area control (• 区域控制) (from the early 1970s to the early 1990s)
Open-ocean extension (• 远海延伸) (from the mid-1990s to the present).36 
During the fi rst stage, the navy was confi ned to the east and west coasts of 
India and parts of the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal in support of ground and 
air operations ashore. The second phase called for a far more assertive control 
of the Indian Ocean. Indian strategists, in this view, divided the Indian Ocean 
into three concentric rings of operational control. First, India needed to impose 
“complete or absolute control” over three hundred nautical miles of water out 
from India’s coastline to defend the homeland, the exclusive economic zone, and 
offshore islands. Second, the navy had to exert “moderate control” over an ocean 
belt extending some three to six hundred nautical miles from Indian coasts in or-
der to secure its sea lines of communications and provide situational awareness. 
Finally, the navy needed to exercise “soft control,” power projection and deterrent 
capabilities, beyond seven hundred nautical miles from Indian shores.37 
Chinese analysts differ over the extent of Indian naval ambitions in the twenty-
fi rst century. But they concur that India will not restrict its seafaring endeavors to 
the Indian Ocean indefi nitely. Most discern a clear transition from a combination 
of offshore defense and area control to a blue-water offensive posture. One com-
mentator postulates that India will develop the capacity to prevent and imple-
ment its own naval blockades against the choke points at Suez, Hormuz, and 
Malacca.38 Unsurprisingly, the prospect that India might seek to blockade Ma-
lacca against China has attracted substantial attention. One Chinese analyst, us-
ing language that would have been instantly recognizable to Mahan, describes the 
244 islands that constitute the Andaman-Nicobar archipelago as a “metal chain” 
(铁链) that could lock tight the western exit of the Malacca Strait.39 Zhang Ming 
further argues that “once India commands the Indian Ocean, it will not be satis-
fi ed with its position and will continuously seek to extend its infl uence, and its 
eastward strategy will have a particular impact on China.”40 The author concludes 
that “India is perhaps China’s most realistic strategic adversary.”41 
While they pay considerable attention to the potential Indian threat to the 
Malacca Strait, Chinese observers also believe the Indian sea services are intent 
on
Achieving sea control from the northern Arabian Sea to the South China Sea• 
Developing the ability to conduct SLOC defense and combat operations in • 
the areas above
Maintaining absolute superiority over all littoral states in the Indian Ocean• 
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Building the capacity for strategic deterrence against outside naval powers• 42 
Amassing long-range power-projection capabilities suffi cient to reach and • 
control an enemy’s coastal waters in times of confl ict
Fielding a credible, sea-based, second-strike retaliatory nuclear capability• 
Developing the overall capacity to “enter east” (• 东进) into the South China 
Sea and the Pacifi c, “exit west” (西出) through the Red Sea and Suez Canal 
into the Mediterranean, and “go south” (南下) toward the Cape of Good 
Hope and the Atlantic.43
Clearly, the Chinese foresee the emergence of a far more forward-leaning In-
dian Navy that in time could make its presence felt in China’s own littoral realm. 
Moreover, the Chinese uniformly believe that New Delhi has embarked on an 
ambitious modernization program to achieve these sweeping aims. Interestingly, 
some have pointed to America’s apparent lack of alarm at India’s already power-
ful navy. This quietude, they say, stands in sharp contrast to incessant U.S. con-
cerns over the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), representing a blatant 
double standard.44 In any event, China’s assessments of Indian capabilities and its 
emerging body of work tracking India’s technological and doctrinal advances are 
indeed impressive. For instance, Modern Navy, the PLAN’s monthly periodical, 
published a ten-month series on the Indian Navy beginning in November 2005. 
Subjects of the articles ranged widely, from platforms and weaponry to basing 
and port infrastructure.45 Not surprisingly, given the decades-long debate within 
China surrounding its own carrier acquisition plans, India’s aircraft carriers have 
attracted by far the most attention.46
A number of Chinese analysts, however, hold far less alarming, if not sanguine, 
views of India’s rise. The former Chinese ambassador to India, Cheng Ruisheng, 
argues that policy makers in Beijing and New Delhi have increasingly abandoned 
their antiquated, zero-sum security outlooks. Indeed, Cheng exudes confi dence 
that improving U.S.-Indian ties and Sino-Indian relations are not mutually ex-
clusive, and thus he holds out hope for a balanced and stable strategic triangle in 
the region.47 Some Chinese speculate that India’s burgeoning friendships with a 
variety of extraregional powers, including the United States and Japan, are de-
signed to widen India’s room for maneuver in an increasingly multipolar world 
without forcing it to choose sides. As Yang Hui asserts, “India’s actions smack of 
‘fence-sitting.’ This is a new version of non-alignment.”48 On balance, then, stra-
tegic continuity might prevail over the potentially destabilizing forces of change.
Even those projecting major changes in the regional confi guration of power 
seem confi dent that India’s rise will neither upend stability nor lead automati-
cally to strategic advantages for New Delhi. To be sure, a small minority in China 
15
Holmes and Yoshihara: China and the United States in the Indian Ocean
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2008
 HOLMES & YOSHIHARA 55
believes that an increased Indian presence in the Indian Ocean would generate 
great-power “contradictions” that could in time lead New Delhi to displace the 
United States as the regional hegemon, consistent with more forceful concep-
tions of an Indian Monroe Doctrine.49 But a far more common view maintains 
that growing Indian sea power will likely compel Washington and other powers 
in Asia to challenge or counterbalance New Delhi’s position in the Indian Ocean 
region.50 Structural constraints will tend to act against Indian efforts to wield 
infl uence beyond the Indian Ocean. Zhao Gancheng, for example, argues that 
China’s fi rmly established position in Southeast Asia and India’s relative unfamil-
iarity with the region will prevent New Delhi from reaping maximum gains from 
its Look East policy.51 
On the strictly military and technological levels, some Chinese analysts believe 
that Indian naval aspirations have far outstripped the nation’s concrete capacity 
to fulfi ll them. Noting that increases in the defense budget have consistently out-
paced the annual growth rate of India’s gross domestic product, Li Yonghua of 
Naval and Merchant Ships derides India’s ambition for an oceangoing naval fl eet 
as a “python swallowing an elephant” (蟒蛇吞象).52 Similarly, Zhang Ming iden-
tifi es three major defi ciencies that cast doubt on India’s ability to develop a fl eet 
for blue-water combat missions. First, India’s current comprehensive national 
power simply cannot sustain a “global navy” and the panoply of capabilities that 
such a force demands. Second, India’s long-standing dependence on foreign tech-
nology and relatively backward industrial base will severely retard advances in 
indigenous programs—especially plans for domestically built next-generation 
aircraft carriers. Finally, existing Indian Navy surface combatants are unequal 
in both quantitative and qualitative terms to the demands of long-range fl eet 
operations. In particular, insuffi ciently robust air-defense constitutes the “most 
fatal problem” for future Indian carrier task forces.53 Interestingly, key aspects of 
Zhang’s critique apply equally to the PLAN today.
This brief survey of Chinese perspectives suggests that defi nitive conclusions 
about the future of Indian sea power would be premature. On the one hand, 
evocative uses of Mahanian language and worst-case extrapolations of Indian 
maritime ambitions certainly represent a sizable geopolitically minded school of 
thought in China. On the other, the Chinese acknowledge that India may not be 
able to surmount for years to come the geopolitical and technological constraints 
it confronts. Such mixed feelings further suggest that Sino-Indian maritime com-
petition in the Indian Ocean or the South China Sea is not fated. Neither side has 
the credible capacity—yet—to reach into the other’s nautical backyard. At the 
same time, the broader geostrategic climate at the moment favors cooperation. 
There should be ample time—until either side acquires naval forces able to infl u-
ence events beyond its own maritime domain, and as long as New Delhi’s and 
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Beijing’s extraregional aims remain largely aspirational—to shape mutual threat 
perceptions through cooperative efforts. 
AN UNCERTAIN GEOMETRY
This initial inquiry into the maritime geometry of the Indian Ocean region sug-
gests that conditions are auspicious for shaping a mutually benefi cial maritime 
relationship among India, China, and the United States. For now, New Delhi 
seems at once sanguine about its maritime surroundings and conscious that it 
lacks the wherewithal to make good on a muscular Monroe Doctrine. While in 
principle India asserts regional primacy, much as James Monroe’s America did, 
it remains content to work with the predominant naval power, the United States, 
in the cause of maritime security in South Asia. If nothing else, this is a matter 
of expediency.
It is worth noting, however, that there is little prospect that India will join the 
United States to contain Chinese ambitions in the Indian Ocean as Japan joined 
the United States to contain Soviet ambitions. India’s independent streak, codifi ed 
in its policy of nonalignment, predisposes New Delhi against such an arrange-
ment. Nor does India resemble Cold War–era Japan, dependent on an outside 
power to defend it against an immediate, nearby threat to maritime security, and 
indeed national survival. The geographic conformation of Japan’s threat environ-
ment signifi cantly heightened the urgency of a highly alert strategic posture. The 
Japanese archipelago closely envelops Vladivostok, home to the Soviet Union’s 
Pacifi c Fleet and the base from which commerce-raiding cruisers had harassed 
Japanese trade and military logistics during the Russo-Japanese War. Tokyo had 
to develop the capacity to monitor Soviet hunter-killer submarines lurking in 
the Sea of Japan and to repel a massive amphibious invasion against Hokkaido. 
India, by contrast, enjoys two great oceanic buffers—the eastern Indian Ocean 
and the South China Sea—vis-à-vis China. As a simple illustration, several thou-
sand nautical miles separate the fl eet headquarters of China’s South Sea Fleet, 
located in Zhanjiang, Guangdong Province, from Vishakhapatnam, the eastern 
naval command of the Indian Navy. Geography alone, then, constitutes a major 
disincentive for New Delhi to enlist prematurely in an anti-China coalition.
For its part, Washington has not yet dedicated serious attention and energy 
to analyzing the future of Indian sea power or the likely confi guration of great-
power relations in the Indian Ocean. It remains hopeful that a durable strategic 
partnership with New Delhi will take shape. Should the three sea powers man-
age to draw in other powers with little interest in infringing on India’s Monroe 
Doctrine or capacity to do so—say, Australia, an Indian Ocean nation in its own 
right, or Japan, which depends on Indian Ocean sea-lanes for energy security—
the regional geometry could become quite complex. But the participation of such 
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powers might also reduce the propensity for competition among the three verti-
ces of the Sino-Indian-U.S. triangle. A wider arrangement, then, warrants study 
in American strategic circles.
Also, as we have seen, China views India’s maritime rise with equanimity for 
now, doubting both New Delhi’s capacity and its will to pose a threat to Chinese 
interests in the region. American hopes and Chinese complacency may not add 
up to an era of good feelings in South Asia, but they may form the basis for coop-
erative relations in the near to middle term.
But this inquiry also suggests that the opportunity to fashion a tripartite sea-
going entente may not endure for long. If India succeeds in building powerful 
naval forces, it may—like Cleveland’s or Roosevelt’s America—set out to make 
the Indian Ocean an Indian preserve in fact as well as in principle. If so, China 
would be apt to take a more wary view of Indian naval ambitions, which would 
seem to menace Chinese economic, energy, and security interests in South Asia. 
Its hopes for a strategic partnership dashed, the United States might reevaluate its 
assumptions about the viability of a consortium of English-speaking democra-
cies. This too would work against a cooperative strategic triangle.
Maritime security cooperation, then, is by no means foreordained. A host 
of wild cards could impel New Delhi toward a more forceful security doctrine. 
Should, say, the United States use the Indian Ocean or the Persian Gulf to stage 
strikes against Iranian nuclear sites, New Delhi might see the need to expand 
its regional primacy at America’s expense. A failure of the U.S.-Indian civilian 
nuclear cooperation accord would have an unpredictable, if indirect, impact 
on the bilateral relationship, fraying Indian patience and potentially loosening 
this “side” of the strategic triangle. Similarly, if China began deploying ballistic-
missile submarines to the Indian Ocean, India might redouble its maritime efforts, 
working assiduously on antisubmarine warfare and its own undersea nuclear de-
terrent. Competition, not cooperation, could come to characterize the strategic 
triangle—perhaps giving rise to some other, less benign regional geometry.
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